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monetary frameworks, documenting the evolution of exchange rate and monetary regimes in Latin 
America during the last two decades. Then it describes the Latin American and world samples of 
inflation targeters and compares their performance to non-targeters, focusing on their success in 
meeting inflation targets, their output sacrifice in achieving low inflation, and their output volatility. 
A more detailed analysis of five IT experiences follows for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Peru, with reference to the design of IT in the world sample of inflation targeters. The paper 
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region (the case of Chile), evaluating how IT has affected inflation expectations and hence the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, using a battery of alternative model estimations and simulations. 
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1. Introduction 
Latin America was the region with the highest inflation in the world until the early 1990s. 
High inflation was the result of many decades of massive neglect of macroeconomic stability
1. 
Fiscal dominance, in the sense that monetary policy was primarily dictated by fiscal financing 
needs, was the rule rather than the exception. 
However, following the industrial countries’ lead in their pursuit of price stability started in 
the 1980s, the region implemented a substantial departure from past policies around 1990. By 
then, most countries in Latin America launched stabilization efforts aimed at reducing inflation 
towards one-digit annual levels. The results have been dramatic. While in the 1980s four countries 
recorded inflation rates above 200% per annum and the average annual regional inflation rate 
stood at 145%, by the end of the 1990s only two large countries (Mexico and Venezuela) had 
annual inflation rates above 10% and the region’s average rate was below 10%. Currently many 
countries have attained low single-digit inflation rates, similar to industrial-country levels. Many 
factors have been behind the decision to make a frontal attack on inflation. First, the poor inflation 
record of the 1980s and the high political and economic costs that it entailed raised the public’s 
demand for price stability. Second, a large improvement in the quality of the debate and economic 
policies was achieved due to the critical mass of policy makers and academics trained at top U.S. 
and European graduate schools. Many of these students returned upon graduation to their 
countries to upgrade the quality of training and public policy. They convinced policy makers and 
the public at large that inflation is costly, the main contribution of monetary policy lies in  delivering 
low inflation,  monetary policy does not have permanent effects on employment, and the cost of 
reducing inflation is much lower  under rational  expectations and credible policies. Third, the 
introduction of market-oriented reforms reflected a growing understanding that macroeconomic 
stability facilitates the functioning of markets and contributes to better resource allocation. 
Stabilization has been achieved under different monetary and exchange regimes in Latin 
America, ranging from dollarization to inflation targeting under floating exchange rates. This paper 
focuses on the experience stabilization under inflation targeting. It does so by assessing the 
implementation and results of inflation targeting in Latin America from a broad perspective. The 
paper starts by reviewing the issues considered in the choice of exchange-rate regimes and 
monetary frameworks in section 2, in the light of recent theory and policy experience. The next 
                                                 
1  But this was not all, during this period economic policies were characterized by having a distrust 
of markets, by promoting heavy government intervention and isolation from foreign trade.   3
section documents the evolution of exchange rate and monetary regimes in Latin America during 
the last two decades. Section 4 describes the Latin American and world samples of inflation 
targeters and compares their performance to non-targeters, focusing on their success in meeting 
inflation targets, their output sacrifice in achieving low inflation, and their output volatility. 
The subject of section 5 is how monetary policy is carried out in five inflation-targeting 
countries in the region (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru), with reference to the design 
of IT in the world sample of inflation targeters. Section 6 focuses on the longest inflation targeting 
in the region (the 1991-2000 case of Chile), evaluating how IT has affected inflation expectations 
and hence the effectiveness of monetary policy, using a battery of alternative model estimations 
and simulations. The main conclusions close the paper.  
2. Alternative Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy Regimes  
What determines the choice of currencies and exchange-rate regimes? In choosing an 
exchange rate regime, initial conditions are important. In particular, for countries where due to a 
long history of high inflation and currency crises a substantial part of asset and liabilities are foreign 
currency denominated, the advantages of flexible exchange rates would be more limited as the 
room for an independent monetary policy would be restricted by its exchange rate effects. In 
contrast, for countries that have in place a monetary and institutional framework capable of 
delivering low inflation, exchange rate flexibility could be advantageous. 
Historically the literature on the choice of an exchange rate regime was based on other 
structural country features. .  However after the early work on exchange rate choices and 
optimum currency areas or OCAs (Mundell 1961, McKinnon 1963), this literature fell into 
oblivion for three decades. Motivated by the experience of the European Monetary Union and the 
abandonment of intermediate regimes by emerging countries in the wake of financial turmoil of the 
late 1990s, a spate of new work is looking at the issue of optimal exchange regimes.
2 
For countries that can make a choice, today’s consensus view holds that the potential 
benefits from monetary union or dollarization (or a 100% credible currency board) stem from 
low(er) inflation, elimination of currency risk and its associated premium, elimination of currency 
transaction costs, and elimination of currency mismatch in foreign assets and liabilities. These 
benefits could be particularly important in countries without  much room to run an independent 
monetary policy. At the other extreme, maintaining a domestic currency under a free float offers 
                                                 
2 Among recent work on exchange- rate regimes are Obstfeld (1995), Ghosh et al. (1997), 
Edwards and Savastano (2000), Frankel (1999), Mussa et al. (2000).   4
potential benefits derived from allowing f or nominal (and hence more real) exchange-rate 
flexibility, an independent monetary policy employed for stabilization purposes, direct access to 
seigniorage revenue, and direct central bank exercise in providing lender-of-last-resort services on 
a temporary basis.  
A host of structural and policy conditions determines the extent of the previous gains and 
losses associated to each regime choice. Traditional OCA factors to be considered comprise: the 
degree of international factor mobility and correlations of factor prices, the extent of domestic 
price and wage flexibility, the degree of foreign trade openness and integration, the degree of 
symmetry of domestic and external shocks and business cycles, and the extent of domestic output, 
export, and portfolio diversification. Other important factors, mostly in the realm of policies and 
financial markets, have been added recently: completeness and depth of domestic financial 
markets and their integration into world markets (particularly in their ability to hedge exchange risk 
and to accept domestic-currency denominated issues of foreign debt) and coordination of 
monetary union or dollarization with overall economic and political union, transfer payments, and 
adoption of similar regulatory and tax codes. 
It is far easier to list the latter costs, benefits, and determining factors in choosing exchange 
regimes than putting numbers to such choices. In fact, an overall evaluation of the relation between 
regime choice and welfare is hampered by three serious limitations: there is no well-established 
encompassing framework that takes account of the various dimensions and variables that 
determine regime choice, there is not much agreement on the empirical weight of different costs 
and benefits that entail such a decision, and the costs and benefits may change over time in 
response to regime changes. Hence, regional or country specific evaluations of exchange regimes 
tend to be partial, emphasizing each factor separately.
3   
Having this difficulty in mind, we may however discuss the possible relations between 
overall country welfare and its choice of exchange regime, using the schedules drawn in Figure 
2.1. Schedule A reflects the textbook case under which regime choice has no bearing on country 
                                                 
3 In addition to various studies on the costs and benefits of EMU, some country evaluations 
outside Europe include Coleman (1999) and Hargreaves and McDermott (1999) for New 
Zealand, and Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) for Chile. The latter authors concludes that, 
among various Southern Hemisphere countries, Chile would gain the least (or lose the most) if it 
gave up its currency. Subject to large idiosyncratic shocks and significant temporary wage and 
price rigidity, and a conservative monetary policy, it is argued that Chile has to gain most from a 
floating exchange rate and an independent monetary policy.    5
welfare, as a result of instantaneous clearing in all domestic markets and their perfect integration 
into complete international goods and capital markets. In the absence of any market friction there 
is no gain from exchange-rate flexibility, independent monetary policy or providing lender-of-last-
resort services when adopting a domestic currency and choosing any degree of exchange-rate 
flexibility  – the only residual issue is a minor one, related to the international distribution of 
seigniorage revenue. At the same time, nothing is gained by giving up the domestic currency, as 
currency transaction costs are nil and perfect financial markets hedge the currency risk premiums 
and currency mismatch. 
A monotonic positive (negative) schedule between exchange-rate flexibility and welfare 
arises when the net benefits (costs) of flexibility are positive and grow (decline) with flexibility. 
Countries that exhibit features like significant lack of factor mobility, domestic wage and price 
sluggishness, low trade integration, low (or negative) correlation of shocks and business cycles 
with the rest of the world, large concentration of output, exports and portfolios, lack of policy and 
regulatory coordination with other countries, low exchange risk premiums, high access to foreign 
markets for exchange-rate hedges and domestic-currency denominated debt, low inflation, a 
stabilizing monetary policy, and low currency transaction costs are reflected by schedule B, and 
the opposite is true for countries reflected by schedule C. 
What about intermediate regimes? At their heyday a decade ago, adjustable pegs seemed 
to provide a perfect compromise between credibility (due to the nominal anchor provided by the 
exchange-rate peg or band) and flexibility (to allow for limited and gradual adjustment of the real 
exchange rate in response to shocks). Both academics and policy makers had in mind a non-
monotonic relation such as schedule, arguing for and adopting variants of crawling pegs, fixed 
bands, or crawling bands. After a decade of growing disappointment with intermediate 
arrangements – caused by a spate of currency misalignment, speculative attacks, and mono or 
twin crises in Europe, Asia, and Latin America – the current consensus for countries that are well 
integrated to capital markets has shifted toward schedule E , consistent with the “corners 
hypothesis” (as espoused by Obstfeld 1995, Summers 2000, Mussa et al. 2000,  Edwards and 
Savastano 2000 and Fischer 2001). While this view is not unanimous (see Williamson, 1996 and 
Frankel, 1999, for arguments in favor of intermediate regimes), the growing country migration 
toward the extreme arrangements provides policy support to the corners hypothesis. Furthermore, 
the disappointment about intermediate regimes is getting broader, encompassing fixed regimes and 
currency boards, on one side, and managed floats, on the other. Financial turmoil and contagion in 
open economies that have adopted currency boards (e.g. Argentina and Hong Kong), and 
protracted high exchange-rate risk premiums after 9 years of Argentina’s currency board 
(reflected both directly and indirectly through large country-risk premiums, see Powell and   6
Sturzenegger 2000), marks disillusion with currency boards and may explain Ecuador’s outright 
dollarization and the recent shift of El Salvador toward dollarization. At the same time, a growing 
view that foreign-exchange interventions are costly and, at best, only yield temporary effects (as 
illustrated recently by the coordinated intervention in support of the Euro), has led Latin American 
countries like Chile, Colombia, and Brazil to adopt clean floats. 
With respect to monetary regimes, once a country decides to pursue a low inflation 
objective it needs to decide about the monetary regime to be used to anchor the evolution of the 
price level. Three fundamental options can be considered: an exchange-rate anchor, a monetary 
anchor, and an inflation target.
 4 
An exchange-rate anchor uses an exogenously determined trajectory of the exchange rate 
as a nominal anchor. A money anchor relies on a pre-committed path for the money supply to 
anchor inflation. In inflation targeting, the anchor for inflation is the publicly announced inflation 
target itself. The credibility of this policy relies on the power given to the Central Bank to orient 
monetary policy towards achieving the target and its willingness to use its power for this purpose. 
When using an exchange-rate target, the Central Bank knows precisely what it has to do; 
the public knows at every moment whether the central bank is succeeding; and the exchange rate 
affects import prices and the prices of other tradables directly.  An exchange rate peg can quickly 
garner credibility, at least for the short term; in the long term, credibility can be retained only by 
success in maintaining the exchange rate peg.  But as we saw above, a fixed exchange rate is very 
costly for a government to maintain when its promises not to devalue lack credibility.  In particular, 
credibility suffers when unemployment is high or the health of the banking system is in jeopardy.  
But this is not all. The use of the exchange rate as an anchor also requires that the 
appropriate institutional structure be developed to prevent the financial system from becoming too 
vulnerable to an eventual exchange rate correction. The latter could be developed through 
appropriate financial sector regulation. This vulnerability develops as exchange rate fixing, with an 
open capital account and weak financial regulation, usually results in undue risk taking and, as a 
consequence, an unsustainable expansion of credit  which could result in a financial bubble, 
increasing financial fragility in the process (Corbo and Fischer, 1995; Edwards and Végh, 1997; 
and Mishkin, 1997). This problem is illustrated by the experience of Chile in the early 1980s and 
Mexico in the first half of the 1990s, and in the recent experience of Asia (Thailand, Korea, 
                                                 
4 On monetary anchors, see Calvo and Végh, 1999; Bernanke, B. S. and F. S. Mishkin, 1997; 
and Bernanke et al. 1999.    7
Malaysia and Indonesia). In all these cases, following the fixing of the exchange rate, the initial 
spread between the domestic and the foreign interest rate --adjusted for the expected rate of 
devaluation-- rose sharply, providing substantial encouragement for capital inflows and credit 
expansion. The final result was a combination of large capital inflows, an expenditure boom, and a 
sharp real appreciation. In these cases, a sudden reversal of capital flows is all that it took to set 
the stage for a major crisis. 
For countries that are not ready or willing to go the avenue of currency boards or full 
dollarization, and decide instead to use a flexible exchange rate system, the question about the 
choice of a monetary framework is still open. For a monetary framework to be successful, it is 
necessary to provide sufficient independence to the central bank to be able to focus its monetary 
policy towards the ultimate objective of achieving low inflation. Leaving out the use of an exchange 
rate peg, the remaining options are the use of a monetary aggregate or an inflation target.  
The effectiveness of the use of a monetary aggregate as a nominal anchor for inflation 
depends, first of all, of the authority and capacity of the central bank to carry out an independent 
monetary policy aimed at achieving and maintaining low inflation. But at a more technical level, the 
effectiveness of a monetary anchor depends on the stability of the demand for the monetary 
aggregate that it is used as an anchor. It is the stability of the demand for the monetary aggregate 
what provides a link between the monetary anchor and the inflation rate. The stability of the 
demand for money presents a problem in cases where there is considerable financial innovation or 
when there is a sudden change in the level of inflation. 
In particular, in an economy that has experienced a period of high and variable inflation, 
the demand for money becomes very unstable as economic agents develop ways to economize in 
the use of domestic money balances. And, therefore, when the rate of inflation is reduced, 
hysteresis effects emerge, generating a breakdown in the old demand for money relationship. That 
is, when the inflation rate returns to previous observed lower values, the quantity of money 
demanded is lower than before the outburst of inflation. In cases like these, predicting the quantity 
of money demanded becomes very difficult and the use of a money target could be a very 
ineffective way to achieve a given inflation objective. Thus, it is not surprising that as countries 
have moved to flexible exchange rate regimes they have searched for new monetary anchors. 
Here a third type of anchor is becoming increasingly popular: inflation targeting. 
IT was initially introduced by industrial countries with the objective of keeping inflation 
close to a long-run low level. New Zealand introduced this system with this purpose first, in 
March 1990. Since then IT has been introduced in Canada (Feb. 1991), United Kingdom (Oct. 
1992), Sweden (Jan. 1993), Australia (1993), and the ECB (Oct. 1998).    8
Under IT, the target rate of inflation provides a monetary anchor and monetary and fiscal 
policies are geared towards achieving the inflation target. The attractiveness of this framework is 
that its effectiveness does not rely on a stable relationship between a monetary aggregate and 
inflation and, at the same time, it avoids the problems associated with fixing the exchange rate. An 
additional advantage for emerging countries is that the trajectory of the market exchange rate 
provides important information on market evaluation of present and future monetary policy, such 
as the information provided by nominal and real yields on long-term government papers in 
industrial countries (Bernanke et. al., 1999). 
A well defined IT framework requires to satisfy a set of conditions (Svensson, 2000 and 
King, 2000). First, public announcement of a strategy of medium-term price stability and an 
intermediate target level for inflation for a period into the future over which monetary policy could 
affect inflation. Second, an institutional commitment to price stability in the form of rules of 
operations for the monetary authority. Third, a clear strategy of how monetary policy will operate 
to bring inflation close to the announced target. This strategy usually starts from a conditional a 
forecast of inflation for the period for which the target is set. This strategy requires specifying 
operational procedures of what the central bank will undertake when the inflation forecast differs 
from the target. The procedures should be transparent and the monetary authority should be 
accountable for attaining the objective that has been set. 
Given the lags in the operation of monetary policy, the inflation target has to be set for a 
period far enough into the future to ensure that monetary policy could have a role in determining 
future inflation. In practice, central banks announce a target for the next twelve or twenty-four 
months. For this time frame they develop a conditional forecast of inflation – based on the existing 
monetary policy stance and a forecast of the relevant exogenous variables – and set a strategy and 
communicate to the public the policy actions they would take in response to deviations of inflation 
from target levels.  
Under IT, the official inflation target is the ultimate objective of policy, and an inflation 
forecast (not always made public) is the intermediate objective
5. Monetary policy, with 
appropriate fiscal underpinnings, is the main instrument used to pursue the target. When the 
conditional inflation forecast is above the inflation target, the level of the intervention interest rate is 
raised with the purpose of bringing inflation close to the target. One advantage of IT is that 
inflation itself is made the target, committing monetary policy to achieve an explicit inflation 
                                                 
5 Sometimes the rate of growth of a monetary aggregate is used as an intermediate objective.   9
objective and thus helping to shape inflation expectations. However, herein also resides its main 
disadvantage. As inflation is not directly under control of the central bank, it becomes difficult to 
evaluate the monetary stance on the basis of the observed path of inflation. Furthermore, as 
monetary policy operates with substantial lags, it could be costly to pre-commit an unconditional 
inflation target – independently of changes in external factors that affect inflation – and to change 
monetary policy to bring inflation back to the target. Aiming at the inflation target when a shock 
causes a temporary rise in inflation could be very costly in terms of a severe growth slowdown or 
increased output volatility (Cecchetti, 1998).  
To address some of these problems, several options have been proposed. First, to set the 
inflation target in terms of a range rather than a point. Second, to set a target for core inflation 
rather than observed inflation. Third, to exclude indirect taxes, interest payments, and energy 
prices from the targeted price index. Fourth, to set the target for periods long enough so that 
short-term shocks to inflation do not require a monetary response
6.  
Emerging markets that have adopted an inflation target starting at inflation levels well 
above their long-run objectives have had to deal with the problem of inflation convergence. 
Usually these countries have started reducing inflation without a full-fledged IT framework and 
place. Once they have made enough progress in reducing inflation, they have announced annual 
targets and gradually put into place the components of a full-fledged IT regime, on their way to 
low and stationary inflation. 
3. Exchange Rate and Monetary Regimes in Latin America 
The recent evolution of exchange rate and monetary regimes in Latin America has been 
conditioned by the region’s increasing integration into world capital markets. Thus LA has been 
moving lately towards two extremes: credible fixed exchange rate systems (currency boards or full 
dollarization) and floating exchange-rate systems. As a result, the once popular exchange-rate 
target regimes of the 1980s and 1990s – difficult to sustain because of increasing capital mobility – 
are being abandoned in the region (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995, IMF 2000). 
Indeed, Latin America shows a strong and continuing trend from pegged exchange-rate 
regimes toward more flexible arrangements during the last two decades. According to the IMF 
classification of exchange-rate regimes, the share of countries with pegs, among 18 LA countries, 
has fallen from 67% in 1979 to only 23% in 2000 (Figure 3.1). The share of countries with freely 
                                                 
6 For a review of the costs and benefits of these alternative options see Bernanke et al. (1999), 
chapter 3.   10
floating rates has increased from zero in 1979 to 32% in 2000. Intermediate regimes (such as 
those where the exchange rate is adjusted by various indicators) have remained stable at 27%, 
while managed floats have increased from 27% to 37%. As compared to the 1999 world 
distribution of exchange rate regimes, LA has relatively more flexible exchange-rate arrangements. 
In a recent paper (Fischer 2001), exchange rate regimes are classified using the judgment 
of IMF staff as reported in the IMF’s Annual Report 2000 (pp. 141-143), and not the regimes 
declared by the countries. A comparison between the distribution of exchange rate arrangements 
in 1991 and 1999 shows that the share of countries with intermediate regimes have been reduced 
substantially (from 62% to 34%) while the share of the extreme cases have increased, from 16% 
to 25% for hard pegs (including the European countries that entered the monetary union) and from 
23% to 42% for the floaters. For emerging markets (i.e., those developing markets that are  more 
integrated into world capital markets), the  change in the share of floaters is even more 
pronounced, from 30% in 1991 to 48% in 1999. In the case of 9 Latin American countries in 
1999, Fischer classifies 5 as independent floaters (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru), 
two as having hard pegs (Argentina and Panama), one with a crawling band (Venezuela), and one 
in the transition to dollarization (Ecuador). This stands in striking contrast with 1991, when only 
Peru was an independent floater, while, Argentina was in transition to a currency board and 
Panama was dollarized. The other six countries had some variant sort of a soft peg (including 
crawling pegs) or a crawling band in place.  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) provide another classification of exchange rate 
regimes, where exchange rate regimes are inferred from the actual behavior of nominal exchange 
rates and foreign reserves (Figure 3.2). In their classification “de facto” pegs are shown to decline 
from 20% in 1979 to 6% in 1999. Moreover: “de facto” free floats represent the dominant share 
(60%) of regimes in LA – a figure that is almost twice the “de jure” share of floats in the IMF 
classification. 
Hence, on average, LA shows an unambiguous decline of pegs and an increase in floating 
regimes, while intermediate regimes do not show much of a trend; except in Fischer (2001). 
Considering the recent regime shifts that have taken place during the last two years (not all of them 
reflected in the data in figures 3.1 and 3.2), various medium-sized and large countries have 
adopted free floats, including Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. It is sometimes claimed that countries 
that declare themselves to have a flexible exchange rate act, in practice, as if their exchange rate 
was  fixed or semi-fixed. According to this view they would exhibit “fear of floating”  (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2000). Not making use of exchange rate flexibility could be due to the central bank’s   11
fear of large pass-through effects from devaluation to inflation or large risks of exchange rate 
adjustment  when private agents exhibit  a currency mismatch of their  assets and liabilities.
7 
Following Calvo and Reinhart (2000), now we analyze how close to real floating these regimes 
are, by comparing the volatility of exchange rates and international reserves before and after the 
formal announcement of a free float. We also compare these measures of volatility with the ones 
for four other countries that are used as a control group. 
The degree of volatility is approximated by the probability that the monthly changes in 
exchange rates and foreign reserves fall within ranges of 1.0% and 2.5%, respectively. When 
carrying out this exercise, we do not control for the fundamentals or shocks that could affect the 
exchange rate and foreign-reserve trajectories, so our conclusions are conditional on t his 
assumption.
8 
The results are reported in Table 3.1. If the exchange regime has not changed much, then 
the probabilities that the percentage changes in the two variables fall within the given ranges should 
not change. However, if official adoption of a float is for real, then the probabilities should be  
lower (higher) in the floating period for the variation in the exchange rate (foreign reserves). In 
Brazil and Mexico this is indeed the case for the nominal exchange rate but not for  foreign 
reserves. In the case of Brazil, this result could be due to the deliberate decision to use foreign 
reserves to pay its foreign debt after the start of floating.
9 For Mexico, there was a deliberate 
policy to avoid large jumps in the nominal exchange rate through explicit exchange rate market 
interventions through the use of foreign reserves.
10 In particular, the central bank sells put option 
                                                 
7 However, recent analytical and empirical work shows convincingly that pass-through effects are 
much weaker than initially thought (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000; Goldfajn and Werlang 2000). 
8 Our monthly frequency is determined by data availability for foreign reserves, for which daily 
data are not available. 
9 More generally, one observes many changes in central bank holdings of foreign reserves in 
countries that float freely, for reasons that are unrelated to foreign exchange intervention purposes. 
Two of the main reasons are deliberate portfolio swaps by central banks and changes in cross-
currency valuations that affect the value of foreign reserve holdings. Moreover, after adopting a 
free float, some countries reduce over time their initial levels of foreign reserves that are excessive 
under a float. However, in the absence of detailed information of portfolio shifts and valuation 
changes, we are not able to adjust our volatility measures for these factors. Hence our measures 
of reserve volatility under floats exhibit generally an upward bias.     12
rights to buy dollars. Every day the central bank auctions 200 million dollars at  a minimum 
exchange rate that is 2% above the preceding day market level. 
In the case of Chile, although the two measures of volatility change in the right direction, 
the differences are not large. Although there has been no intervention since February 1999 in the 
foreign exchange market, the exchange rate volatility has increased only by little. This can be 
attributed that much volatility was already observed under the preceding regime of a wide 
exchange rate band. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) who found that the Chilean exchange 
rate regime was de facto flexible during most of the 1990s confirm this. In Peru, exchange rate 
volatility is similar to the floating period of Chile but the volatility of foreign reserves is larger. The 
latter result indicates that Chile got more stability with less intervention. 
The measures of volatility for the two industrial countries with free floats (Canada and 
New Zealand) show that they are not really free floaters in the limited sense of our unconditional 
tests: they exhibit significant volatility in foreign reserves and not much in the exchange rate. By 
contrast, the two industrial countries that were pegging their currencies to the deutschmark 
(Austria and The Netherlands) exhibit very low volatility in their exchange rates and high volatility 
in their foreign reserves. When comparing the volatility of the LA declared free floaters with that of 
New Zealand, we conclude that Chile and Colombia exhibit similar exchange-rate volatility but 
lower foreign-reserve volatility. In contrast, Brazil has larger exchange-rate volatility. 
At the other extreme of exchange rate regimes, Ecuador joined in early 2000 Panama in 
choosing a credible fixed exchange rate regime by adopting the US dollar. El Salvador adopted a 
similar step toward this direction in late 2000, declaring the US dollar as legal tender on an equal 
footing to the Salvadoran currency. 
Hence a very recent shift, not yet reflected in the data, and away from the intermediate 
arrangements and toward the extremes is taking place in the region, consistent with the “corners 
hypothesis”. 
Now let’s focus on the country distribution of nominal targets (or nominal anchors) chosen 
by central banks in their conduct of monetary policy (Figure 3.3). According to the IMF survey of 
                                                                                                                                                     
10 We divide the second period into two subsamples (1994:12-1997:12 and 1998:1-2000:9) to 
test if the high volatility of foreign reserves was observed during the full floating period. Our results 
confirm that from 1998:1 onwards, foreign reserves were more stable than in the previous period 
(61.7% of probability that the percentage change falls within the 2.5% band). So it appears that 
Mexico is really floating today.   13
185 countries in the world for 1999, half of them have an exchange-rate anchor in place, while 
8% use monetary aggregates, and 9% use inflation targets. A 32% share of countries has either no 
explicit target or uses a combination of targets. In an alternative study by Sterne and Mahadeva 
(1998) for 93 countries (where countries that choose more than one target appear more than 
once), the country distribution among the three anchors is much more balanced. Moreover, more 
than half of the countries in their group targets inflation, either exclusively or among other nominal 
targets. 
Our own measures of country distribution for LA (also with double counting) show a 
distinct shift away from exchange-rate targets in LA. Of 11 LA countries representing more than 
90% of LA GDP, 8 countries targeted the exchange rate in 1994 (under a peg, a band or a 
managed float) while only 3 countries continued doing so in 2000 (Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela). At the same time those targeting monetary aggregates increased from 1 in 1994 to 2 
in 2000 (Mexico and Peru). However, in Mexico monetary aggregates have been used 
increasingly as an intermediate objective with the final objective of targeting inflation. Inflation 
targeters increased from 5 in 1994 to 6 in 2000 (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and 
Uruguay). Among the latter, full inflation targeters (as of October 2000) are Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico.   
Finally let’s consider the combined time trend of exchange rate and monetary regimes in 
LA. Table 3.2 shows how the number of countries with intermediate combinations (currency 
boards to adjustable pegs, combined with exchange rate or monetary-aggregate targets) is 
declining between 1994 and 2000. In fact, there is a trend away from intermediate arrangements, 
weakly toward the upper-left corner and much more strongly toward the lower-right corner. In 
fact, one additional country has been added to the upper-left corner (Ecuador adopting 
dollarization) and four additional countries have positioned closely to the lower-right corner 
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, in addition to Peru, adopting a free float combined with 
inflation targeting). The lower-right corner dominates not only regarding number of countries but 
also in terms of the combined weight of its members as a share of Latin America’s GDP.   14
4. The World Experience with Inflation Targeting Regimes: Preliminary Results 
in Latin America in Comparison to Other Regions and Regimes 
In this section we describe the Latin American and world sample of inflation targeters 
(ITers) and compare their performance to that of non-targeters. We focus in particular on their 
inflation performance and success in meeting their targets, as well as their output sacrifice in 
achieving lower inflation and their output volatility.
11 
IT started in 1990 with public announcements of inflation targets in New Zealand and 
Chile. According to Schaechter et al. (2000), there had been 13 “full-fledged” IT experiences in 
the world up to February 2000: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, Israel, 
New Zealand, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Of the latter, Finland 
and Spain had abandoned IT in January 1999 when they joined the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). In our count 17 “full-fledged” IT country experiences have been started before or until 
October 2000, as we add Korea, Mexico, Thailand, and Switzerland to the 13 above-mentioned 
countries. 
However, in order to conduct our empirical analysis for the 1986-1999 period, we 
consider a sample of 18 countries, subdivided into 3 main groups, according to the extent of IT 
adoption (Table 4.1). The first is comprised by 15 full inflation targeters (call “ITers”), subdivided 
into Latin American full ITers (Brazil and Chile), 8 “old” full ITers from other regions (countries 
that have had IT in place dating back at least to 1995) and five “recent” ITers (countries that have 
adopted IT during the last 2 years). The second group is comprised by three “partial” ITers in LA 
(Colombia, Peru, and Mexico), which have officially announced targets in place but lack some of 
the components of a full-fledged IT framework.
12 Our third set is a control group of 10 industrial 
economies that either target the exchange rate or monetary aggregates, or have no explicit target in 
place, or, in the case of EMU members, have adopted the Euro after targeting their exchange 
                                                 
11 Recent books and articles describe the design features and general results of inflation targeting 
(IT) in the small but quickly growing number of countries that have adopted inflation targeting (IT) 
since 1990. See in particular Leiderman and Svensson (1995), Mishkin and Posen (1997), 
Bernanke et al. (1999), Kuttner and Posen (1999), Haldane (1999), Mishkin (2000), Mishkin 
and Savastano (2000), Schaechter et al. (2000). 
12 Mexico became a full ITers in October 2000 but is considered a partial ITers for the purpose 
of the historical analysis.   15
rates for most of the 1990s to the deutschmark. We label this control group as non-inflation 
targeters (Non-ITers).
13 
Figure 4.1 depicts adoption dates and inflation rates at adoption of 15 full ITers and 3 LA 
partial ITers.
14 The following stylized facts are apparent from inspection. Only 5 industrial 
countries had IT in place in 1999. Among emerging economies, Chile, Israel, and Peru adopted 
IT in the early 1990s. However 8 additional emerging countries have been added since 1998. 
One salient feature of the international IT experiences is that many emerging countries 
adopted IT while they were still at inflation levels well above stationary inflation rates. In Chile and 
Israel inflation stood at 25% and 17%, respectively, when adopting IT in the early 1990s. In Peru 
inflation was 42% when adopting IT in early 1994. Among the newcomers, Colombia, the Czech 
Republic, and Mexico had inflation rates of 10% at adoption, Korea and Poland had initial 
inflation rates in the 5.0-7.0% range, and Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand had inflation levels 
below 3%. The subsequent success of emerging countries in bringing inflation toward low 
stationary levels is prima facie evidence that IT can be successfully adopted to reduce inflation 
from (low) double-digit levels toward low single-digit rates. 
How successful have been countries in reducing inflation and meeting their targets under 
IT? We measure IT success in three simple dimensions: the reduction of inflation shortly before 
and after adopting IT, the speed at which inflation was brought down from the start of IT through 
the attainment of stationary inflation, and the average deviation of inflation outcomes from target 
levels. 
A general feature of IT is that countries prepare when adopting IT by reducing inflation 
around the date of IT adoption (year t). This feature is generally observed in industrial and 
emerging, transition and stationary, full and partial ITers (Table 4.2). All 18 countries, with the 
exception of Chile, have reduced their inflation rates between years t-3 and t+1.
15 The range of 
                                                 
13 Switzerland fully adopted IT in February 2000 but is considered a non-ITer for the purpose of 
the historical analysis. 
14 Starting dates are defined by the first month of the first period for which inflation targets have 
been announced previously. For example, the starting date for Chile is January 1991 (the first 
month of calendar year 1991, for which the first inflation target was announced in Sep. 1990). The 
initial inflation level is defined as the year-on-year CPI inflation rate of the last quarter before the 
first month of inflation targeting (For instance 1990.4 in the case of Chile). 
15 This result is not sensitive to the choice of period around IT adoption.    16
inflation reduction scores is very wide, as it includes massive stabilization cases that brought 
inflation down from high inflation levels (at the extreme: from triple-digit levels in Peru) as well as 
cases where inflation was close to low stationary levels (e.g. in Canada, Spain, and Thailand). 
Now let’s consider the speed of convergence to stationary inflation among ITers (Table 
4.3). Average convergence time of inflation to stationary inflation (or to current inflation in the case 
of ITers that have not converged yet) has been 8 quarters, at an average disinflation rate of 0.6% 
per quarter.
16 Among the countries that have completed transition to their long-term stationary 
target levels, Chile and Israel had the longest transition periods (around 8 years) – perhaps not 
surprising, considering their high initial inflation rates. Australia and Sweden were on the other 
extreme as they adopted IT when they had already attained stationary inflation. 
ITers have been generally very successful in meeting their inflation targets. Performance is 
measured here as each country’s average annual absolute or relative inflation deviation from its 
officially announced point or range target. We express these figures both in percentage points and 
relative to inflation (Table 4.4). 
The overall record of the 18 IT experiences in the world is an annual average absolute 
deviation of 1.04 percentage points (or 0.50 per percentage point of inflation). However the 
dispersion of individual country records is large. Among old full ITers – those countries that have 
had at least 4 years of IT experience – the average annual absolute inflation miss from target is 
lowest in Canada (at 0.20 percentage points), followed by Chile and New Zealand (at 0.40 
percentage points, and is highest in Israel at 1.67). Relative to inflation, the best target 
performance among old full ITers is achieved by Chile and the UK (at a 0.12 deviation relative to 
inflation), followed closely by Israel (at 0.14), while the largest misses are recorded by Australia 
(1.44) and Finland (2.12). At a regional level, the record of full and partial ITers in LA – with the 
exception of Colombia – is comparable to the attainment of inflation targets in other regions. 
It is straightforward to compute sacrifice ratios  – i.e. percentage GDP losses per 
percentage units of inflation reduction – as measures of the costs of disinflation under IT. Sacrifice 
ratios are computed for 18 ITers and for the inflation stabilization from 3 years before to 1 year 
after IT adoption (see Table 4.5) – the strong stabilization period identified in Table 4.2. 
Among LA IT experiences, GDP sacrifice ratios have been very low – even negative in 3 
of the 5 countries. The same is true for the 5 recent full ITers outside the region. In contrast, 
                                                 
16 When considering only the 14 countries that have achieved convergence to their stationary 
inflation targets by early 2000, roughly the same averages are obtained.   17
sacrifice ratios have been positive and relatively large for the 8 full and old ITers outside the 
region, with an average sacrifice of 0.88 percentage points of GDP per percentage point of 
inflation reduction. (The only exemption was Canada with a large negative sacrifice ratio). 
An alternative way is to compare sacrifice ratios for disinflation periods under IT to 
sacrifice ratios before adopting IT, and to comparable sacrifice ratios among non-ITers (Table 
4.6). Sacrifice ratios for ITers before IT adoption are computed for the period from 1980 to the 
year of adoption, and afterwards through 1999. For the control group of 10 non-ITers, sacrifice 
ratios are calculated for the decade of the 1990s. In both Chile and Peru  – the longest IT 
experiences in LA – sacrifice ratios turned from positive before IT to negative afterwards. This 
stands in contrast to the group of 8 full old ITers outside the region, where sacrifice ratios 
changed, on average, from –0.32 to +0.19 after IT adoption. Also here there are two exceptions, 
however: in Israel and Finland sacrifice ratios turned negative after IT adoption. 
Among non-ITers, sacrifice ratios have been larger during the 1990s, on average, than 
among IT countries after t heir IT adoption. The average sacrifice ratio among 10 industrial-
country non-ITers is 0.30 for the last decade, with a dispersion that includes countries with 
positive and negative ratios.  
The results suggest that IT does not make necessarily reduce sacrifice ratios in industrial 
countries that already had relatively low inflation before adopting IT and does not necessarily 
improve their performance in comparison to other non-IT industrial countries. However, there is 
some evidence that IT reduces the cost of stabilization in emerging economies that start at 
moderate or high levels of inflation  – possibly a double bonus earned from the reduction of 
inflation per se and the gain in credibility from guiding inflation expectations by announcing (and 
attaining) official inflation targets.   
Finally we report volatility of industrial output before and after IT adoption, and compare 
it to output volatility among industrial-country non-ITers (Table 4.7). Volatility – measured as the 
standard deviation of quarterly industrial output from its Hodrick-Prescott trend – fell in 10 of 11 
IT countries after adoption of IT, in comparison to their pre-IT volatility. Output half or more in 
four IT countries cut volatility: Chile, Peru, Australia, and Canada. Average post-IT volatility in the 
10 IT countries is 2.4, a figure that is somewhat lower than the 3.3 average volatility in the control 
group of 10 non-IT industrial countries. In sum, adoption of IT by emerging and industrial 
countries is correlated with a large decline in their output volatility, to levels that are similar to (or 
somewhat smaller than) those observed in non-IT OECD economies.   18
5. The Recent Shift toward Inflation Targeting in Latin America 
Different varieties of IT are applied today in five Latin American countries: Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. What did prompt their central banks to adopt this particular 
monetary regime? As in other regions, early IT adopters in the region started this new regime in an 
evolutionary way, by announcing public inflation objectives and learning only over time – from 
other countries’ and their own experience – about the necessary prerequisites and components of 
what now is viewed as a full-fledged IT regime (see Banana et al. 1999 and Stealthier et al. 
2000).  
As elsewhere in the world, four main factors have prompted Latin American countries to 
adopt IT. First, public announcement of central bank inflation targets makes targets the economy’s 
nominal anchor and the main policy objective of monetary policy. Second, forward-looking 
numerical inflation targets complement public information about monetary policy objectives and 
implementation to make monetary policy more effective in a world of forward-looking rational 
private agents. Third, publicly announced inflation targets are an easy way to make central banks 
accountable to society at large and their political representatives – a major prerequisite imposed 
on newly independent central banks. The latter factor can explain IT adoption in countries with 
long democratic tradition but have recently granted operational independence to central banks 
(like many industrial-country inflation targeters) and others that have embraced democracy only 
recently (like the Latin Americans in the 1990s).
17  Finally, disappointment of alternative monetary 
and exchange rate regimes – ranging from true disappointment with money growth targets to 
abandonment of fixed exchange rate regimes after full-fledged balance-of-payments crises – led 
many countries to adopt IT as the only remaining alternative.   
The main design and implementation features of IT in LA are summarized in Table 5.1. 
For comparison, the features of IT are summarized for inflation-targeting countries in other 
regions, divided into newcomers  (Table 5.2) and old-timers (Table 5.3). 
The third and fourth columns of Table 5.1 report announced target levels and actual 
inflation rates for the five LA targeters. The last two columns of the table report the exchange rate 
system and the target index considered. The five countries have adopted a floating exchange-rate 
                                                 
17 Among industrial countries the UK is an outlier of the general case of independence-to-IT 
sequencing: IT adoption in 1992 preceded operational independence granted by the Blair 
government in 199??? to the Bank of England. Among developing-country targeters, the Central 
Bank of Brazil adopted full IT in 1999 but has still not been granted full operational independence.    19
system after using (with the exception of Peru) currency bands in the 1980s or 990s. The first 
country to abandon the currency band was Mexico after its late-1994 crisis. The three other 
countries abandoned their exchange-rate bands in 1999, when they faced high costs in interest 
rates and activity when defending the exchange-rate bands.  
 Chile started to build up IT in 1990, following the announcement of an inflation objective 
introduced in the first report to the Senate by the then newly independent Central Bank. The 
second country that announced inflation targets, although without a formal IT system, was Peru in 
1991. At the time the announced inflation objective was part of a broader stabilization program 
supported by  the IMF. Then Colombia, Brazil, and finally Mexico moved toward announcing 
targets. As of today, only Brazil (since June 1999) and Chile (since May 2000) have in place full-
fledged IT regimes. Among other features, both countries have fully relinquished use of any 
monetary growth and exchange rate targets and issue regular inflation reports with numerical 
inflation forecasts over the relevant projection horizons. 
Mexico announced in October 2000 inflation targets for the next three years in a system 
that it is quickly converging toward a full-fledged IT framework. Colombia has been struggling 
with the introduction of IT since the early 1990s. The country had trouble in pursuing the inflation 
objective with sufficient strength due to persistent problems of fiscal dominance and the 
simultaneous pursuit of a real exchange rate objective. As a result, its stabilization program lacked 
full credibility and, not surprising, inflation performance has suffered too. It was only after 
Colombia abandoned its exchange rate band and adopted a float (September 1999), that the 
Central Bank could focus its attention more closely on reducing inflation. In Peru a strong 
stabilization commitment of the Ministry of the Economy and the Central Bank is in place, even in 
the absence of a full-fledged IT system. Rather the Central Bank pursues monetary targets, usually 
in conjunction with IMF programs. But as progress has been made in reducing inflation, the 
country has been moving towards the adoption of more formal IT. 
On paper, central bank legal objectives differ widely among countries. In Mexico and 
Peru the official objective of the central bank is defined as the attainment of price stability, while in 
Brazil the central bank pursues a dual objective of currency and price stability. In Chile and 
Colombia there are multiple official objectives: price stability and the stability of the domestic and 
foreign payments systems. However, in all countries the primary objective governing monetary 
policy has become price stability. Progress  in reducing inflation and formalization of inflation 
targets has been made possible by institutional developments that have provided larger degrees of 
independence to central banks. The central banks of the five countries have been provided 
substantial degrees of independence in the 1990s and central bank loans to the government are 
prohibited. Legal independence is observed in the five countries. However, full goal independence   20
in setting inflation targets is only observed in Mexico where the target is set solely by the central 
bank. In Chile and Peru the target is set by the central bank in consultation with the government, 
while in Brazil and Colombia it is set jointly by the government and the central bank. With respect 
to the use of instruments, the central banks of Brazil, Mexico, and Peru enjoy full operational 
independence in using their monetary instruments (the interest rate or monetary base). In the case 
of Brazil, the monetary instrument is the overnight nominal rate of short-term government debt. In 
Chile it is the overnight real interest rate. In Colombia, Mexico and Peru the monetary instrument 
is the daily monetary base. In the five countries open market operations are used to attain target 
levels for the monetary instrument. They are conducted on central bank bonds (in Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru) or on treasury bonds (in Brazil and Mexico)  
In Chile, the Minister of Finance is a non-voting member of the Central Bank Board and is 
entitled to suspend board decisions for up to two weeks, for decisions that have not been 
approved unanimously by the Board. However governments have not yet exercised this option 
since central bank independence was granted in 1990. In Colombia the Minister of Finance is the 
President of the Central Bank Board and one of  seven members. The rationale for this 
arrangement is that it purportedly contributes to raise coordination between fiscal and monetary 
policy makers. However, this has not always been the case – indeed many times it has been a 
source of friction between monetary and fiscal authorities. 
Finally, all countries other than Peru issue regular inflation reports that differ significantly in 
scope and coverage from country to country.   21
6. The Inflation Targeting Experience of Chile: Does the Introduction of a Target 
make a Difference? 
Chile was the first country to start IT in Latin America and is the first to both complete its 
transition toward a full-fledged IT framework and convergence to stationary inflation. Hence this 
country experience is of special interest. In particular, it may be of interest to study if IT has 
contributed to reduce inflation and if it made a difference in the speed and cost of price 
stabilization. 
In their study of IT in industrial countries, Banana et al. (1999) found non-conclusive 
evidence on the latter questions. Thus although IT made a difference in the behavior of variables 
related to inflation, they did not find evidence that countries that applied IT benefited from lower 
stabilization costs. However they found that the introduction  of IT made a difference in the 
trajectory of macroeconomic variables related to inflation. 
Here we analyze the role played by the introduction of IT on the reduction of Chilean 
inflation, as well as the costs associated to this reduction. The main question to be addressed is if 
the setting of IT had an effect on the structure of the economy and inflation dynamics in particular. 
In our model below, the main channel through which inflation target affects inflation 
dynamics is through is effect on inflation expectations, that in turn affect price and wage inflation. 
Inflation expectations, an endogenous variable in our model, are measured in two alternative ways. 
First, by comparing nominal and real interest rates of similar instruments. Second, using exogenous 
inflation forecasts published by Consensus Economics (Latin American Consensus Forecasts, 
various issues). One could expect that announced inflation targets were not fully credible at early 
stages and thus their effects on inflation expectations should become more important only over 
time. This learning period should show up in the results. 
 
The Effects of IT on Expected Inflation 
First we study if IT adoption in late 1990 made a difference for inflation dynamics. We 
start by generating inflation forecasts for the 1990s from single-equation inflation models estimated 
for the period before IT adoption. We use three models: (1) a Phillips curve, (2) a reduced-form 
inflation equation, and (3) an ARIMA time-series model
18. In all models we use a measure of core 
                                                 
18 After the model selection procedures, we estimate an ARMA model for core inflation, with 
quarterly and monthly data.   22
inflation that excludes perishable products from the headline CPI. The models are estimated with 
monthly data (12-month rates of change) and quarterly data (quarter-on-quarter rates of change), 
from the mid-1980s through late 1999. 
Model-based out-of-sample inflation forecasts are reported in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. The 
results are informative and consistent, showing that forecasts based on the three models are well 
above actual declining inflation levels.
19 This provides some prima facie evidence that something 
occurred after introducing IT that contributed to reducing inflation. 
However, the simple comparison of forecasts does not address the question about what 
was behind the success in achieving inflation rates below the forecasts. One could argue that 
inflation reduction was not a result of introducing IT but due to other factors such as the payoff 
from earlier structural reforms, fiscal orthodoxy or the sharp appreciation in the wake of large 
capital inflows during the early 1990s.  
To take into account possible changes in the structure of the economy but short of 
specifying a complete structural model (which is our task below), we estimate an unrestricted 
VAR model. The VAR system comprises as endogenous variables core inflation, the rate of 
change of the monthly index of aggregate economic activity, the rate of change of nominal money 
(M1), the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, and the policy interest rate. Foreign 
inflation is taken as an exogenous variable.
20 All variables are expressed as 12-month rates of 
change. We estimate this VAR model using rolling regressions, leaving out the first year of the 
sample and adding one year at a time, starting with data through December 1991. The inflation 
forecasts obtained from these VAR models are reported in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. Although 
forecasts became closer to actual inflation rates when adding more recent years (and leaving out 
earlier ones), the ratio between the forecast errors and actual inflation levels stayed fairly constant 
over time. 
Now we want to investigate if the announced inflation targets played a role in the path of 
inflation reduction. An obvious hypothesis to analyze is if the target affected inflation expectations, 
providing through this channel an anchor for the inflation process. If this were the case, then the 
unemployment cost of reducing inflation would be lower under IT than under a conventional 
stabilization strategy not based on IT. 
                                                 
19 The difference between the forecasts and the actual values becomes very large after 1993. 
20 We also used the terms of trade as an additional exogenous variable but the results were not 
much affected by their inclusion.   23
In order to analyze the effects of the targets on inflation expectations, we start with the 
most direct measure of inflation expectations: inflation expectations published in Latin American 
Consensus Forecasts (CF) by Consensus Economics.
21 First we compare the CF expectations 
measure with two measures derived from VAR models and with actual inflation. The first VAR 
model (VAR1) comprises the variables defined for the previous VAR model, except for replacing 
core inflation by headline (total) CPI inflation.
22 The second VAR (VAR2) adds the inflation target 
as an exogenous variable additional to those included in VAR1. Both VAR models are estimated 
with monthly data of 12-month variations of the variables by rolling regressions, with data through 
December of each preceding year. 
The results of these comparisons for December-to-December inflation are reported in 
Table 6.1. They show that CF market inflation expectations are quite different from the values 
estimated from the VAR models and from announced targets levels. Moreover, the discrepancy 
between CF inflation expectations and the inflation targets becomes smaller over time. This result 
provides evidence that inflation targets became more credible with the passing of time and the 
attainment of annual inflation rates close to announced target levels. Hence the use of IT, along 
with an appropriate institutional support allowing the public to understand that the main objective 
of monetary policy is to attain inflation close to target levels, facilitated Chile’s process of price 
stabilization. Furthermore, inflation itself is less sensitive to nominal shocks than in a system without 
the IT anchor. In addition, the existence of the target and a clear Central Bank commitment to its 
achievement also provides some insurance against conventional time inconsistency problems of 
macroeconomic policies. 
 
                                                 
21 We thank Consensus Economics for providing  this data series. 
22 We replaced core inflation by  headline (total) CPI inflation because the targets are defined as 
December-to-December changes of the headline CPI index.   24
The Effects of IT on Inflation: A Small Structural Model of Chilean Inflation 
In order to learn more about the process by which IT introduction helped to reduce 
inflation, now we specify and estimate a small econometric model for Chilean inflation. The 
literature on the modeling of inflation in Chile using structural models is extensive.
23 We will 
concentrate on open-economy type models studied during the last fifteen years. Corbo (1985) 
built a model of Chilean inflation to study inflation dynamics up to the early 1980s, using a reduced 
form of the Salter-Swan-Dornbusch dependent economy model. Corbo and Solimano (1991) 
investigated the dynamics of Chilean inflation up to the late 1980s, using a small structural model. 
Edwards (1993) examined the question of Chilean inflation dynamics and inertia in the context of 
the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for the 1974 to 1982 period. 
Corbo and Fischer (1994) estimated a small structural model similar to that used in Bruno 
(1978), Corbo (1985) and Bruno (1991). In their solution of the structural model, they found that 
substantial inertia characterized inflation during the 1980s. Finally, Corbo (1998) estimates a 
model where inflation expectations enter in the wage equation but not in the price equation. Also in 
his model the policy interest rate and the output gap are taken as exogenous, hence they are not 
solved within the model. 
The model that we use is an extension of the model used in Corbo (1998), where inflation 
expectations, measured by the comparison of nominal and real interest rates of similar instruments, 
enters explicitly into the wage and inflation equation. Furthermore, inflation expectations are 
determined by a four-quarter moving average of the previous inflation, the inflation target, and an 
expectation error. 
                                                 
23 For earlier models for Chilean inflation see Harberger (1963). For a review of inflation models 
for countries with moderate inflation see Dornbusch and Fischer (1993).   25
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t p   core inflation, quarterly rate of change. 
= t p   headline CPI inflation, quarterly rate of change. 
= +
E
t 1 p  expected rate of inflation, quarterly, for period t+1 based on  information available 
at period t. 
= t w   quarterly rate of change of the wage rate. 
= t e ˆ   quarterly rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, in pesos per dollar. 
= t e4 ˆ   4-quarter moving average of  t e ˆ . 
=
*
t p   external Inflation in dollars, quarterly rate of change. 
= t gap gap between the seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP and its trend, as a percentage 
of the trend. The trend is measured using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
= t tot   4-quarter moving average of the log of the terms of trade. 
= t prbc real interest rate of Central Bank debt paper with 90 days of maturity (PRBC-
90),  annual rate. 
= t KPIB capital inflows as percentage of nominal GDP. 
= t desem quarterly unemployment rate. 
= t gdcc current account deficit of the year ending in quarter t, as percentage of nominal 
GDP.   26
= D t RIN quarterly change in Central Bank foreign reserves, in US dollars. 
= t DESV difference between the log of the market nominal exchange rate and the log of 
the central parity of the exchange rate band, both in period t.  
= t Tar  quarterly inflation rate implicit in the inflation target announced by the Central 
Bank.
24 
D2, D3, D4=  seasonal dummies for the second, third and fourth quarter, respectively. 
D96=  dummy variable that takes the value of one from the first quarter of 1996 until the 
end of the sample (2000:III) to reflect the sharp increase in capital inflows. 
A93, A94, A96, A98= dummy variables that take the value of one for 1993, 1994, 1996 
and 1998, respectively, for irregular supply shocks that could affect the difference between core 
and headline CPI inflation. 
Equation (6.1) for core inflation is specified as a weighted average of inflation for tradable 
and non-tradable goods and services, and includes also expected inflation. Equation (6.2) for 
wage inflation includes lagged inflation (reflecting explicit indexation schemes in wage contracts) 
and expected inflation (reflecting forward-looking wage contracts). Equation (6.3) specifies the 
output gap as a function of its own lag, the terms of trade, the lagged value of the real interest rate, 
and capital inflows. Equation (6.4) relates the unemployment rate to the output gap (Okun’s law). 
Equation (6.5) specifies the current account deficit ratio to GDP as a function of the output gap 
and its lagged value. Equation (6.6) describes the evolution of the nominal exchange rate within the 
exchange-rate band that was in place until late 1999. Equation (6.7) relates expected inflation to 
the forward-looking inflation target, a moving average of lagged inflation levels, and an inflation 
forecast error term. Equation (6.8) relates actual inflation to core inflation, introducing also 
seasonal dummies and annual dummies for particular weather and oil- related shocks. 
Model estimation results are reported in Table 6.2. We now proceed to compare 
simulated values (obtained from the model’s dynamic simulation) and actual values for core 
inflation. In the first simulation we take the actual real interest rate as given. The comparison of 
simulated and actual values for core inflation is shown in Figure 6.5. It can be observed that model 
forecasts are quite close to actual values, except for 1997. Using these simulated values as a 
benchmark (BENCHMARK 1), we proceed now with the first counter-factual simulation. Here 
                                                 
24 Computed by the authors linearizing the target expressed as a December-to-December rate of 
change.   27
we analyze (SIMULATION 1) what would have happened if the target had not been made public 
and therefore had not affected expectations
25. That is, in SIMULATION 1 we simulate the 
dynamic response of the Chilean economy if inflation expectations in the 1990s had been formed 
in the way they were formed in the 1980s. 
The comparison of simulated values with those from the benchmark model is presented in 
Figure 6.6. Simulated values are above benchmark values, particularly at the end of 1996. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the introduction of explicit inflation targets helped in 
reducing inflation. The mechanism at work is through the effect of the inflation target on inflation 
expectations, and of the latter on wage inflation and core price inflation. A clearer picture emerges 
when comparing the cumulative sum over four quarters of quarterly inflation simulated by 
SIMULATION 1 to the benchmark values (Table 6.3). The comparison suggests again a clear 
break since late 1996, showing that the effect of the target on actual inflation became important 
only some time after introducing IT. This is not surprising, as in the early stages the public was 
probably uncertain about the Central Bank’s commitment to attain the inflation target. It was also 
for 1996 that the Central Bank announced (in September 1995) a more aggressive target of 
6.5%, while the target for the 1995 had been set at 9% and actual inflation had reached 8.2%.  
A final issue that we address is regarding the likely macroeconomic effects of alternative 
stabilization paths. Here we run two counter-factual simulations for the speed and intensity of price 
stabilization in the 1990s: a more gradualist disinflation path (SIMULATION 2) and a more 
aggressive path  (SIMULATION 3). The gradualist strategy considers a reduction in target 
inflation by only 0.5 percentage point per year starting in 1994. The cold-turkey stabilization 
assumes a target inflation of 3% for 1996 and beyond (Table 6.4). 
When altering the targets, the policy interest rate has to be changed accordingly. Hence 
the structural model presented above has to be extended to include the following policy reaction 
function for the Central Bank: 
  
                                                 
25 For this purpose, we first estimate an equation for inflation expectations for the period before 
the introduction of IT ( until the fourth quarter of 1990) and use this equation to model inflation 
expectations in the 1990s.   28
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This policy reaction function is consistent with Corbo (2000), that extend previous work 
by Taylor (1993) and Clarida et al. (1998) for countries that follow a target of gradual inflation 
reduction. In this equation, the policy interest rate is specified as a function of the gap between 
expected inflation and target inflation, the gap between the current account deficit ratio to GDP 
and a target ratio (which is set at 4.5% of GDP), and the lagged value of the policy rate.
27 
The amended model (that now includes the policy reaction function) is run to provide a 
new set of benchmark results (BENCHMARK 2). The results for simulated core inflation and 
actual core inflation are compared in Figure 6.7. Now the simulated values are closer to the actual 
values than the ones obtained by the BENCHMARK1 model results. Hence, by endogenizing the 
policy interest rate, the interest rate is adjusted when the inflation forecast differs from the target 
level, helping to bring actual inflation closer to the target. 
The counter-factual simulation results f or core inflation under the gradualist strategy 
(GRADUAL), the cold-turkey approach (COLD TURKEY), and the benchmark case 
(BENCHMARK 2) are reported in Figure 6.8. Unsurprisingly, core inflation under the gradualist 
(cold-turkey) approach is well above (below) the BENCHMARK 2 path. However the 
differences between the gradualist and benchmark simulations start declining toward the end of the 
simulation period. In the case of the cold-turkey target, the convergence of the simulated values 
toward target values is much slower, confirming that inflation exhibits substantial inertia and that 
the selection of a hard target could have resulted in higher unemployment and only a small gain in 
terms of lower inflation. 
The comparison of unemployment paths for both strategies is presented in Figure 6.9. The 
latter is a result of slow adjustment of expected inflation towards the target level. To throw further 
light on the cost of disinflation we also compute the sacrifice ratio for the reduction of inflation, 
comparing the cumulative sum of the unemployment increases with the cumulative sum of the gains 
in inflation reduction. The computed sacrifice ratio is –1.26. By contrast, in the case of the 
                                                 
26 In this equation, 
S
t 4 p  is the four-quarter cumulative sum of quarterly core inflation rates,  t Tar4  
is the four-quarter cumulative sum of quarterly target inflation rates, and D983 is a dummy variable 
(equal to 1 in the third quarter of 1998). 
27 As the right hand side variables of this equation are endogenous variables, we estimate this 
equation using generalized method of moments (GMM) in order to obtain consistent and efficient 
coefficient estimates.   29
gradualist strategy the sacrifice ratio is only  –0.95, showing that alternative disinflation speeds 
entail different costs of employment and output. 
Now we check the robustness of our results by using an alternative definition of expected 
inflation, that is the CF measured instead of the difference between nominal and real interest rates. 
For this purpose, we re-estimate equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.7), using the alternative measure of 
inflation expectations. Then after introducing these new equations in the model, we run again the 
benchmark and the two counter-factual simulations. The results, reported in Figures 6.10 and 
6.11, are fairly similar to the ones discussed above.  The sacrifice ratios are –1.26 for the cold-
turkey strategy and -0.99 for the gradualist approach. This confirms the robustness of our results 
to alternative measures for inflation expectations. 
It could be claimed that the comparison between the cold-turkey and gradual approaches 
to disinflation conducted above does not represent properly the cold-turkey case because 
expected inflation does not adjust at once to the target level
28. That is, it does not assume full 
credibility of the inflation target, which is still given by equation (6.7). Thus to take into account a 
fully credible cold-turkey approach (using the CF measure of inflation expectations) we impose in 
equation (6.7) the restrictions  m0=m2=m3=0 and  m1=1. The result of the simulation for this 
restricted version of equation (6.7) is reported in figures 6.12 and 6.13. As can be seen, the 
reduction of inflation would have been quicker at the beginning than in the case without full 
credibility, while the unemployment cost is not so much different in both cases. The sacrifice ratio 
for this case is –0.529 instead of the –1.26 obtained for the case with partial credibility and it is 
even lower than in the case of the gradualist approach. Therefore we conclude that the actual 
sacrifice ratio of the cold-turkey approach is bounded between –1.26 and –0.529.
29  
                                                 
28 We thank Alejandro Werner for this point. 
29 It should be mentioned that in the price and wage equations, the actual values of the coefficients 
also depend on the degree of credibility of the inflation target and therefore with full credibility the 
coefficients of expected inflation in both equations could be higher resulting in an even lower 
sacrifice ratio.   30
7. Conclusions 
After 40 years of high and variable inflation, during the last decade Latin America has 
made major progress toward eradicating inflation. As a result, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century average inflation is below 10% and several countries are well on the way towards 
achieving and maintaining low one-digit inflation levels. Inflation reduction was made possible by a 
frontal attack on public sector deficits and by a deliberate effort to break the historical inflation 
dynamics that resulted in high inertia. The recent experience of industrial countries in their pursuit 
of price stability played an important role by providing a technology to accommodate exchange 
rate flexibility with monetary discipline: inflation targeting. Ultimately it has been the combination of 
progress in achieving fiscal discipline and the restricted discretion embedded in IT that made 
possible the success in inflation reduction. 
This paper has examined the recent experience of inflation targeting in Latin America. A 
review of alternative exchange rate and monetary policy regimes allowed setting the stage by 
analyzing different arrangements and their pros and cons, in the light of theory and recent 
international experience. Then a brief review of the empirical evidence on the distribution of 
regimes during the last two decades in the world at large and Latin America in particular was 
conducted. A clear, recent shift away from intermediate exchange regimes is noted particularly in 
Latin America where a few countries have adopted currency boards or outright dollarization, 
while many more countries have adopted free floats, typically in conjunction with IT. 
A worldwide comparison of implementation and performance of IT provides various 
preliminary results of interest for the 5 Latin American inflation targeters. Most ITers brought 
inflation significantly down around the year of adoption of IT, were successful in attaining their 
target levels, and exhibit sacrifice ratios and output volatility that are lower after than before 
adopting IT and comparable to (or sometimes lower than) the levels observed in non-IT industrial 
economies. Among ITers, the Latin Americans have performed comparatively well. Fiscal 
discipline and institutional developments that have provided more independence to central banks 
have supported the adoption of IT and the progress in reducing inflation. 
Chile is the country that has used IT for the longest period and where inflation has already 
converged to the steady-state long-term target. Hence it is of much interest to draw the lessons 
from this experience. Three main lessons emerge. First, the initial progress in reducing inflation 
toward the target is slow as the public is learning about the true commitment of the central bank to 
attain the target. Second, the gradual phasing in of IT helped in reducing inflation expectations, 
contributing to reduce inflation directly by lowering inflation expectations and indirectly by 
changing wage and price dynamics. Third, with respect to the speed of inflation reduction, a cold–  31
turkey approach would have resulted in a larger sacrifice ratio stemming from higher 
unemployment during the early years of IT when credibility was gradually built up.   32
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Figure 3.1 



















Source: For years 1979, 1985, 1991 and 1995 for Latin America and 1999 for World 
Distribution: IMF: International Financial Statistics (2000). For the year 2000 for Latin 
America: authors’ classification based on central banks’ statements and web pages. 
18 countries are included in Latin America’s distribution: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
World distribution includes 185 countries.   38
 
Figure 3.2 
Country Distribution of Exchange-Rate Regimes in Latin America: 



















Source: Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000).  
Latin America: Same countries as in Figure 1. However, sample size varies in time, as some 
country regimes are deemed “inconclusive” under this analysis. Those regimes are not 
included in the distribution. “Inconclusive” countries are: 
1979: Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela. No information available 
for Nicaragua and Uruguay. 
1985:  El Salvador and Venezuela. No information available for Colombia, Nicaragua, and 
Uruguay. 
1991: Chile and El Salvador. No information available for Nicaragua. 
1995: El Salvador and Paraguay. No information available for Nicaragua. 
1999: El Salvador. 
World distribution includes 102 countries (after eliminating 23 “inconclusive” countries).   39
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Figure 3.3 
Country Distribution of Nominal Targets for Monetary Policy: 





























Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics (2000) and Sterne and Mahadeva (2000) for 
world distribution. 
Mishkin and Savastano (2000) and central banks’ statements and web pages for Latin 
American countries. 
IMF classifies 185 countries. Stern and Mahadeva (2000) include 93 countries.  
LA sample: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Mexico, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela 
*: Countries with more than one nominal anchor or explicit targets are classified by the 
IMF in the “None/Various” group, the same as countries with no explicit targets. Sterne 
and Mahadeva (2000) separately account for each possible target, so countries appear in 
more than one category. Hence, only countries with no explicit nominal target are included 
under “None/Various” in their classification. The same applies to the sample of Latin 
American countries (Bolivia’s credit target is classified as “None/Various”).   41
Table 3.1: Exchange Rate and Foreign reserves Volatility. 
 




Probability that the monthly percent change 
falls within 
 
+- 1%  +- 2.5%  +- 1%  +- 2.5% 
BRAZIL  1995:1-1998:12  58.8  97.3  9.7  24.0 
  1999:1-2000:7  4.9  14.4  6.8  16.9 
Chile  1985:1-1989:12  29.8  67.0  10.4  25.5 
  1990:2-1999-8  46.2  87.7  20.3  48.1 
  1999:9-2000:9  34.9  74.6  46.2  86.3 
Colombia  1990:2-1999:8  30.9  68.5  25.8  58.9 
  1999:9-2000:9  30.7  66.1  31.4  68.0 
Mexico  1990:2-1994:11  65.7  98.2  5.9  14.7 
  1994:12-2000:9  12.4  30.4  3.6  9 
Peru  1992:2-2000:9  29.8  66.3  13.8  33.7 
Austria  1990:1-1998:12  100  100  15.2  36.8 
Canada  1990:1-2000:5  63.4  97.5  1.1  2.8 
Netherlands  1990:1-1998:12  100  100  15.7  37.9 
New Zealand  1993:2-2000:9  36.7  76.5  12.0  29.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on each country Central Bank’s information, except for 
Austria, Canada and Netherlands, which are based on IFS. 
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Table 3.2 
Exchange-Rate Regimes and Nominal Targets in 11 Latin American Countries: 1994 and 2000 
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(Credit Target) 
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(Credit Target) 
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Argentina    Uruguay 
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Latin America  Rest of the World 
Full ITers  Partial ITers  Old Full ITers  Recent Full 
ITers 
Non ITers 
Brazil  Colombia  Australia  Czech Republic  Denmark 
Chile  Mexico  Canada  Poland  France 
  Peru  Finland  South Africa  Germany 
    Israel  Korea   Italy 
    New Zealand  Thailand  Japan 
    Spain    Netherlands 
    Sweden    Norway 
    United Kingdom    Portugal 
        Switzerland 
        United States 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.   44
Figure 4.1 















































(1) Inflation attained one quarter before adopting IT. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFS, country sources, and Schaechter et al. 
(2000).   45
Table 4.2 
Disinflation around Year of Adoption of Inflation Targeting: 18 Countries
(1) 
Latin America  Rest of the World 
Full ITers  Partial ITers  Old Full ITers  Recent Full ITers 
Brazil  -15.8  Colombia  -10.9  Australia  -5.4  Czech Republic  -7.0 
Chile  0.8  Mexico  -24.9  Canada  -2.5  Poland  -20.2 
    Peru  -398.4  Finland     -5.0  South Africa  -3.7 
        Israel  -9.3  Korea   - 3.7 
        New Zealand  -14.1  Thailand  -2.6 
        Spain  -2.4     
        Sweden  -8.3     
        United Kingdom  -7.0     
Average  -7.5        -6.8    -7.4 
(1) Disinflation measured as change in annual inflation rate between 3 years before and 1 year after 
IT adoption year. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFS, country sources, and Schaechter et al. 
(2000).   46
Table 4.3 
Convergence to Stationary Inflation under Inflation Targeting in 18 Countries: 1989-2000
(1) 
  Initial 
Inflation 
(Date)  Final 
Inflation 








LA Full ITers               
Brazil
(2)  8.3  (1999.4)  7.9  (2000.1)  1  -0.4  -0.4 
Chile  29.0  (1990.4)  3.8  (1999.1)  33  -25.2  -0.8 
Average  18.7    5.9    17  -12.8  -0.6 
LA Partial 
ITers 
             
Colombia  10.0  (1999.2)  10.6  (2000.2)  4  0.6  0.2 
Mexico  17.6  (1998.4)  10.6  (2000.1)  5  -7.0  -1.4 
Peru  41.5  (1993.4)  2.8  (1999.3)  23  -38.7  -1.7 
Average  23.0    8.0    11  -15.0  -1.0 
Old Full ITers               
Australia  1.2  (1993.1)  1.2  (1993.1)  0  0.0  - 
Canada  4.9  (1990.4)  1.6  (1992.1)  5  -3.3  -0.7 
Finland  2.5  (1992.4)  2.0  (1993.3)  3  -0.5  -0.2 
Israel  18.5  (1991.4)  1.9  (1999.4)  24  -16.7  -0.7 
New Zealand  4.4  (1989.2)  2.8  (1991.2)  8  -1.6  -0.2 
Spain  4.7  (1994.3)  1.6  (1997.2)  11  -3.1  -0.3 
Sweden  1.8  (1992.4)  1.8  (1992.4)  0  0.0  - 
United 
Kingdom 
3.6  (1992.3)  1.8  (1993.1)  2  -1.8  -0.9 
Average  5.2    1.8    7  -3.4  -0.5 
Recent Full 
ITers 
             
Czech 
Republic 
10.1  (1997.4)  2.9  (1999.1)  5  -7.2  -1.8 
Poland  7.0  (1998.3)  10.3  (2000.1)  6  3.3  0.6 
South Africa  2.0  (1999.4)  2.0  (1999.4)  0  0.0  - 
Korea   5.1  (1997.4)  0.7  (1999.1)  5  -2.4  -0.5 
Thailand  0.8  (2000.1)  0.8  (2000.1)  0  0.0  - 
Average  5.0    3.3    3  -1.3  -0.6 
Overall Avg.  9.6    3.7    8  -5.8  -0.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFS, country sources, and Schaechter, et al. 
(2000). 
(1) Convergence refers to most recent available observation. Stationary inflation for countries that 
do not explicitly announce a long-term inflation target is calculated as inflation attained by industrial 
countries (2-3%). 
 (2)  Initial Inflation is calculated 2 quarters ahead, in order to adjust for the extraordinarily low 
inflation in 1999:1.   47
Table 4.4 
Annual Average Deviation of Actual from Target Inflation under Inflation Targeting in 
18 Countries: 1989-2000 (various subperiods)
(1) 
  (Percentage points)  (As a ratio to current inflation) 
             Relative            Absolute            Relative            Absolute 
LA Full ITers         
Brazil  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Chile  -0.12  0.40  -0.08  0.12 
Average  -0.06  0.20  -0.04  0.06 
LA Partial ITers         
Colombia  -5.23  5.23  -0.54  0.54 
Mexico  -0.68  0.68  -0.06  0.06 
Peru  -0.67  0.77  -0.05  0.14 
Average  -2.19  2.23  -0.22  0.25 
Old Full ITers         
Australia  -0.18  1.13  1.25  1.44 
Canada  -0.15  0.20  -0.60  0.67 
Finland  -0.69  0.69  -2.12  2.12 
Israel  0.46  1.62  0.02  0.14 
New Zealand  0.06  0.40  -0.08  0.25 
Spain  0.15  0.45  -0.01  0.21 
Sweden  -0.71  0.71  1.05  1.05 
United Kingdom  0.09  0.31  0.00  0.12 
Average  -0.12  0.69  -0.06  0.75 
Recent Full ITers         
Czech Republic  -0.60  0.82  -0.26  0.29 
Poland  1.00  1.00  0.10  0.10 
South Africa  -  -  -  - 
Korea   -2.30  2.30  -0.71  0.71 
Thailand  -  -  -  - 
Average  -0.63  1.37  -0.29  0.37 
Overall 
Average 
-0.60  1.04  -0.13  0.50 
(1) Relative (absolute) deviation: sum of relative deviations divided by number of periods. Relative 
(absolute) deviation as a ratio to current inflation: sum of relative (absolute) deviations as ratios to 
inflation divided by number of periods. Depending on the IT framework, inflation target is defined 
as a range or as a point. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFS, country sources, and Schaechter, et al. 
(2000).   48
Table 4.5 
Sacrifice Ratios during Inflation Stabilization with Inflation Targeting 
in 18 Countries: 1998-2000  (based on annual GDP data, various subperiods)
(1) 
Latin America  Rest of the World 
Full ITers  Partial ITers  Old Full ITers  Recent Full ITers 
Brazil  -0.15  Colombia   0.15  Australia   1.14  Czech 
Republic 
-0.66 
Chile  -0.40  Mexico  -0.03  Canada  -2.25  Poland  -1.07 
    Peru   0.06  Finland   2.44  South Africa  -2.27 
        Israel   0.60  Korea    0.39 
        New Zealand   0.16  Thailand   1.89 
        Spain   2.50     
        Sweden   0.64     
        United Kingdom  0.89     
Average  -0.28     0.06     0.77    -0.87 
(1) Sacrifice ratios calculated as cumulative GDP variation (to a trend calculated by a Hodrick-Prescott filter) divided by inflation change between 3 
years before and 1 year after IT adoption year. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFS and country sources. 
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Table 4.6 
Sacrifice Ratios during Inflation Stabilization in 18 IT Countries and 10 Non-IT Countries: 1980(1990)-2000 (based on annual 
GDP data, various subperiods)
(1)  
Latin America  Rest of the World     
Full ITers  Partial ITers  Old Full ITers  Recent Full ITers  Non ITers 
  Before  After      Before  After    Before  After    Before  After    During 1990s 
Brazil  0.42  -    Colombi
a 
-0.06  -  Australia  -1.41   0.01  Czech 
Rep. 
-5.69  0.36   Denmark  0.90 
Chile  0.37  -0.7    Mexico  -0.11  -  Canada  -6.84   0.64  Poland   0.04  -   France  -0.45 
        Peru   0.84  -0.75 Finland   0.03  -4.74  South 
Africa 
-0.17  -   Germany  -0.12 
              New Zealand  -0.67   0.22  Korea  -1.92  0.59   Italy  0.25 
              Spain  -0.85   0.82  Thailand  -1.72  -   Japan  1.46 
              Sweden   0.08   0.22         Netherlands  1.47 
              United 
Kingdom 
 0.75   0.02         Norway  -0.87 
              Israel   0.17  -0.14         Portugal  -0.39 
                           Switzerland  0.87 
                           United States  0.78 
Average  0.40  -0.7      -0.09  -0.75    -0.32
(2)  0.19
(2)   -2.83  0.48     0.39 
(1) Sacrifice ratios calculated as the cumulative GDP variation (to a trend calculated by a Hodrick-Prescott filter) divided by inflation change in 
any disinflation period. ITers’ sacrifice ratios are calculated before (since 1980) and after adopting IT framework. 
(2) Excluding Canada and Finland. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFS and country sources. 
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Table 4.7 
Output Volatility in 18 IT Countries and 10 Non – IT Countries: 1980-2000  
(based on quarterly industrial production data, various subperiods)
(1) 
Latin America  Rest of the World 
Full ITers  Partial ITers  Old Full ITers  Recent Full ITers  Non ITers 
  Before  After    Before  After    Before  After    Before  After       
Brazil  4.8  -  Colombia  4.5  -  Australia  2.8  1.2  Czech Rep.  9.4  4.3    Denmark  2.8 
Chile  6.2  3.1  Mexico  4.0  -  Canada  4.4  2.2  Poland  8.5  -    France  1.6 
      Peru  11.5  5.1  Finland  3.1  2.5  South Africa  3.2  -    Germany  2.4 
            Israel  2.9  1.7  Korea  3.6  -    Italy  2.3 
            New Zealand  3.4  3.1  Thailand  5.5  -    Japan  3.3 
            Spain  2.4  1.7          Netherlands  2.2 
            Sweden  3.1  3.4          Norway  2.8 
            United Kingdom  2.4  1.3          Portugal  10.8 
                          Switzerland  2.8 
                          United States  2.3 
Average  5.5  -    6.7  -    2.6  2.1    6.0  -      3.3 
(1) Volatility calculated as standard deviation of industrial production variation (to a trend calculated by a Hodrick-Prescott filter). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IFS and country sources. 
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Table 5.1: Latin American Inflation Targeters 
Country  Date 
Introduced 






           
Brazil  June 1999  1999: 8% (+ - 2%) 
2000: 6% (+ - 2%) 












           

























rate band used 
before 
Total CPI 
           

























           
Mexico  1999  1999: 13% 
2000: < 10% 
2001: 6.5% 
2002: 4.5% 
2003: similar to principal 









crisis in 1994 
Total CPI   52
Table 5.1: Latin American Inflation Targeters (continued) 
Country  Date 
Introduced 































1/ 12 months to August 
2/ 12 months to September 
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Table 5.1: Latin American Inflation Targeters (continued) 






Central Bank Legal Framework 





Yes  - Instrument independence 
- Loans to National Treasury 
prohibited 
- If the target is failed, the Central 
Bank has to send an public letter to 
the Minister of Finance explaining the 
reasons of the failure and the actions 
necessaries to return to the correct 
path 
- Currency stability and price stability 
as objectives 
         







Yes  - Instrument independence, but 
Finance Minister can suspend Board 
decisions for two weeks except for 
decisions unanimously taken by the 
Board 
- Loans to Government prohibited 
- Price stability as primary objective. 
Normal functioning of the internal and 
external payment systems as 
secondary objectives 
         





Yes  - Minister of Finance is the President 
of the Board 
- Loans to the Government prohibited 
- Price stability and financial system’s 
strength as objectives  
         
Mexico  Central Bank  Monetary Base 
(daily) 
Yes  - Instrument Independence 
- Loans to Government prohibited 
- Price stability as objective 
         







No  - Instrument independence 
- Loans to Government or state 
institutions prohibited 
- Restrictions to loan portfolio 
composition prohibited 
- Multiple exchange rates prohibited 
- Price stability as objective 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.   54
Table 5.2: Recent inflation targeting countries 










Floating  Underlying CPI (exc. 
regulated prices and indirect 
taxes) 
         
Korea  1998  1998: 9% +- 1% band 
1999: 3% +- 1% band 
2000: 2.5% +- 1% band 
From 2001 onwards: 2.5% 
Floating. 
Exceptionally, if there 
is a large discrepancy 
in the exchange 
market, which 
increases volatility, 
Central Bank can 
intervene 
Underlying CPI (exc. non-
cereal agricultural products 
and petroleum based 
product prices). In 1999 and 
1998, the target was total 
CPI 
         




Floating  Total CPI 
         
South 
Africa 
February 2000  2002: 3-6%  Floating  Underlying CPI (exc. 
Interest costs) 
         
Thailand  April 2000  From 2000 onwards: 0-3.5%  Floating. Short interest 
rates can be adjusted 
in the case of 
pressures over the 
exchange rate 
Average quarterly 
underlying CPI (exc. raw 
food and energy prices) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.   55
Table 5.3: Old inflation targeting countries 
Country  Date Introduced  Target Inflation Rate  Exchange Rate 
Regime 
Target Index 
Australia   1993  2-3% on average over 
business cycle 





         
Canada  February 1991  Dec. 91: 3-5% 
Dec. 92: 2-4% 
June 94: 1.5-3.5% 
Since Dec. 95: 1-3% (in 
effect until Dec. 2001) 
Floating  Underlying CPI (exc. 
Food, energy and 
indirect taxes) 
         
Finland 
1  February 1993- 
June 1998 
Annual average of 2% by 
1995 
EMU  Underlying CPI (exc. 
Indirect taxes, subsidies, 
housing prices and 
mortgage interest) 
         














         
New 
Zealand 




Since 1997: 0-3% 
Floating  Total CPI 
3 
         
Spain 
1  November 1994- 
June 1998 
June 1996: 3.5-4% 
Dec. 1997: 2.5% 
1998: 2% 
EMU  Total CPI 
         
Sweden  January 1993  Since 1995: 2% (+-1%)  Floating  Total CPI 
         
United 
Kingdom 
October 1992  1992-1995: 1-4% 
Since 1995: 2.5% 
Floating  RPIX (exc. Mortgage 
interest) 
1/ Spain and Finland fixed their currencies to the Euro in January 1999 
2/ Treasury underlying CPI in Australia excludes roughly half of CPI basket. Since September 
1998, authorities decide to set the target in terms of a revised total CPI index that is more ample 
and well known by the public. 
3/ In 1999 the New Zealand Statistical agency removed interest charges from the CPI. Prior to 
then the inflation targets where defined in terms of the total CPI less interest charges and other first 
round effect prices   56
Table 5.3: Old inflation targeting countries (continued) 
Country  Escape Clauses  Target set by  Monetary Policy 
Operating Target 
Central Bank Legal Framework 







The RBA is required to consult 
with the Government. There is a 




         
Canada  Aim to get back 
on track over 2 
years in the 
event of a 
temporary price 
shock affecting 







Instrument independence, but 
Minister of Finance can 
exceptionally issue a formal 
directive to the Central Bank 
Governor 
 
Loans to Government restricted 
 
Multiple objectives 
         
Israel  None  Government in 
consultation 






Loans to Government prohibited 
 
Multiple objectives (currency 
stability and real objectives) 




will be tolerated 










Instrument independence subject 
to a requirement that monetary 
actions be taken with regard to 
financial system soundness 
 
Price stability as primary objective 
(Central Bank Governor may be 
dismissed in case the target is not 
achieve) 
         





Loans to Government prohibited 
 
Price stability as primary objective 
         
United 
Kingdom 




Price stability as primary objective   57
Figure 6.1 
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Figure 6.3 
Out-of-Sample Forecasts from Rolling VARs 
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Figure 6.5 
Observed and Benchmark values of the Core Inflation 
















Core Inflation: Counterfactual 1 
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Figure 6.7 
Observed and Benchmark 2 values of the Core Inflation 
















Core Inflation: Benchmark 2 and Alternative Targets. 
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Figure 6.9 
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Core Inflation: Benchmark 2, Soft Targets and Aggressive Targets using CF. 
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Figure 6.11 
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Core Inflation: Benchmark 2 and Aggressive Targets with Partial and Full Credibility 
using CF. 
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Figure 6.13 
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Table 6.1 
Inflation Forecasts and Expected Inflation 
(Dec. to dec. rate of change) 
 
    Observed  Consensus  VAR1  VAR2  Target 
1991    18,7        17,5 
1992    12,7    19,4    15,0 
1993    12,2  15,4  23,1    11,0 
1994    8,9  11,3  18,5    10,0 
1995    8,2  8,7  8,2    9,0 
1996    6,6  7,1  9,4  9,1  6,5 
1997    6  5,7  6,6  6,7  5,5 
1998    4,7  4,8  6,7  5,2  4,5 
1999    2,3  4,2  3,9  4,5  4,3 
Source: Authors’ calculation.   65
Table 6.2 
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Source: Authors’ estimation. 
 
This is the version used for the simulations and the counterfactuals. All the restrictions over 
the coefficients were tested before they were imposed, including the homogeneity of degree one for the 
price and wage equations, equation (6.1) and (6.2).   66
Table 6.3 
Core Inflation: Benchmark and Simulation 1 
(4-quarter accumulated sum of quarterly rates) 
  Benchmark  Simulation 1 
Dec-93  11,6  12,9 
Jun-94  10,3  11,5 
Dec-94  10,2  10,9 
Jun-95  9,6  10,0 
Dec-95  7,6  8,6 
Jun-96  7,7  9,2 
Dec-96  8,6  10,4 
Jun-97  7,5  9,5 
Dec-97  6,4  8,9 
Jun-98  6,6  9,4 
Dec-98  7,3  10,0 
Jun-99  5,9  8,5 
Source: Authors’ calculation in base of the estimated model. 
 
Table 6.4 
Alternative Paths for the Inflation Targets 
(Dec. to Dec. rate of change) 
  Effective  Soft  Aggressive 
Dec-91  17,5  17,5  17,5 
Dec-92  15,0  15,0  15,0 
Dec-93  11,0  11,0  11,0 
Dec-94  10,0  8,0  10,5 
Dec-95  9,0  5,0  10,0 
Dec-96  6,5  3,0  9,5 
Dec-97  5,5  3,0  9,0 
Dec-98  4,5  3,0  8,5 
Dec-99  4,3  3,0  8,0 
Dec-00  3,5  3,0  7,5 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 